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Abstract
Labor market ﬂ  exibility continues to be one of economics, politics and society highly debated topic. In 
recent years, the impact of increased labor market ﬂ  exibility on research and innovation has gained more 
and more attention. Previous studies have shown, depending on the measurement of ﬂ  exibility as well as 
on the data that both positive and negative inﬂ  uences can be found. However, the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility in 
terms of wage rigidities has hardly been explored empirically. With the use of a unique dataset combining 
comprehensive information from both employers and employees we can accomplish variables not only to 
numerical and functional, but also to ﬁ  nancial wage ﬂ  exibility. In a panel probit model, we show that the 
inﬂ  uences of most of the indicators of wage ﬂ  exibility are positive and vary by type of innovation. While 
the variables of wage bargaining has a higher impact on process innovations, information about speciﬁ  c 
wage levels, however, affects in particular the development of new products. The same applies to a separate 
consideration of wage bargaining levels. Aspects of numerical and functional labor market ﬂ  exibility, in 
contrast, act negative on all types of innovation. Thereby, part time employees affect particularly processes, 
while ﬂ  exible employment contracts have a stronger inﬂ  uence on product innovations. It seems that new 
products depend more on employment status and the resulting motivation of the employees. 
Keywords: Labor market ﬂ  exibility, innovation, wages, collective bargainingPage ● 8
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1. Introduction
Globalization with the associated increasing international competition and the rapid technological 
change cause both economic and social changes that require greater adaptability and mobility of businesses 
and employees. In addition, the demographic change challenges the labor market of many countries. For 
these reasons, it is required to adapt the institutions of the labor market to the more ﬂ  exible requirements, 
in order to solve the problem of unemployment and to ensure continued efﬁ  cient labor market. Therefore, 
many labor market economists call for a greater labor market ﬂ  exibility, especially after the sharp rise in 
unemployment in Europe in the 70s and 80s.1 In addition, a lot of studies followed, which imply a positive 
impact of increased ﬂ  exibility in the labor market on growth and productivity.2 The impact of labor market 
ﬂ  exibility on economic aspects has been discussed for a long time. This relates to inﬂ  uences on employ-
ment, growth, proﬁ  ts or productivity.3 The theoretical approaches differ depending on the subject and the 
precise measurement of labor ﬂ  exibility. There are many different hypotheses, and numerous studies for its 
empirical veriﬁ  cation.4
However, possible negative repercussions of increased labor market ﬂ  exibility should also be consid-
ered. A company’s success always depends on the motivation of its employees. Particularly cost intensive 
projects require the willingness of employees, to bear the risk of a company. At the same time, the call for 
a greater security, especially since the crisis, continues to grow. This is also reﬂ  ected in the new concept of 
`ﬂ  exicurity’.5
Exactly this trade-off between ﬂ  exibility and security as a working motivation concerns the generation 
of innovations. In recent years, the interest in potential impacts of labor market ﬂ  exibility on research and 
innovation has increased. Innovation is considered as a driving force for productivity, competitiveness and 
growth.6 The emergence of an innovation is understood as a complex process, inﬂ  uenced by various ac-
tors in both technical and social perspective. In this way, the national and regional environment, including 
its political frameworks, the supply of labor and knowledge and its speciﬁ  c economic structure affects the 
generation of innovations.7 To support research and innovation, it is therefore necessary to know possible 
1  See e.g. Brodsky (1994), OECD (1994) or Siebert (1997).
2  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
3  For a survey of theoretical approaches see Towers (1992) or Solow (1998).
4  A review of labor market ﬂ  exibility, its deﬁ  nitions and implications can be found in e.g. Solow (1998), Beatson (1995) or Sal-
vanes (1997).
5  Wilthagen and Tros (2004).
6  See e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1998).
7  See e.g. Braczyk et al. (2004) or Edquist and McKelvey (2000).Page ● 10
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inﬂ  uential factors in order to develop targeted policy measures. The importance of research and innovation 
in Europe is underlined by the Lisbon Strategy of the European Commission. Against this background and 
given the ﬁ  nancial crisis and its impact on employment and growth, research with regard to the concrete 
implementation of different types of innovation has regained its importance. 
Some studies on this subject already exist, even though the data is not always on a sufﬁ  cient compa-
ny level.8 Additionally, ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility has hardly been explored empirically in previous investigations.9 
Pooling three datasets from the Netherlands, we obtained several measures of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility. Together 
with data on numerical and functional ﬂ  exibility, we can therefore characterize labor market ﬂ  exibility much 
more extensive. 
In chapter 2, we give a deﬁ  nition of labor market ﬂ  exibility and show brieﬂ  y the incidence and develop-
ment of its elements. The following chapter 3 introduces possible effects of labor market ﬂ  exibility on in-
novation and provides a short survey of previous studies. Due to the lack of research, we focus on ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  exibility and present some hypotheses about possible impacts. The available data is summarized in chapter 
4. After a description of the empirical model in chapter 5, its results are presented in the subsequent chapter 
6. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes some conclusions.
8  See Freeman (2005) or Zhou et al. (2011). Studies with data on company level e.g. Arvanitis (2005), Michie and Sheehan (2003) 
or Kleinknecht et al. (2006).
9  Zhou et al. (2011): p. 3. Approaches of wage ﬂ  exibility can be found in Sanchez and Toharia (2000).Page ● 11
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2.  Labor market flexibility
Labor market ﬂ  exibility can be deﬁ  ned as the capacity of the labor market to adapt quickly to changes in 
economy or society. But what exactly includes the term labor market ﬂ  exibility? The most commonly used 
deﬁ  nition is given by Atkinson (1985). He divides labor market ﬂ  exibility as a function of corporate strategy 
in three different groups, the numerical, functional and ﬁ  nancial. In addition, external and internal aspects 
of ﬂ  exibility can be distinguished.
External numerical ﬂ  exibility refers to the mobility of employees between different companies by 
cancelations and new entries. Thereby, it illustrates the extent to which the number of employees can be 
adapted quickly to economic requirements. Options of external numerical ﬂ  exibility are the increase of 
ﬂ  exible employment contracts as part-time or temporary employment. These forms of employment fa-
cilitate terminations and recruitments of associates and thus allow an easier adjustment to the number of 
employees to economic changes. Internal numerical ﬂ  exibility refers to the ability of companies to adjust 
the working hours of their employed workers. It can affect daily, weekly or annual working time as well as 
seasonal arrangements or short-time work.
Functional ﬂ  exibility describes how a company can use its employees for different tasks. It may be in-
creased through continued training of employees so that multi-skilled workers are applicable to different 
ﬁ  elds of work. In addition, an external solution is possible through outsourcing or temporary employment.
Financial ﬂ  exibility can be deﬁ  ned as the ﬂ  exibility of wages. This means that wages will not be negoti-
ated collectively. In this way, wages represent the equilibrium supply and demand in the labor market. This 
results in a larger difference between the wages of individual employees.10 
In Europe, part-time employment and temporary employment contracts are usually labeled as atypi-
cal work. In selected sectors and especially for certain groups of employees atypical work is now common 
practice.  11 Looking at the data from the OECD (2010), the share of temporary employment increased from 
1994 to 2009 on average across all OECD countries. However, the results of the individual countries differ 
signiﬁ  cantly. In most countries, women and especially young people aged 15-24 have more frequently a tem-
porary employment contract.12 A similar picture emerges for part-time contracts. The shares are also signiﬁ  -
cantly higher for women, because they use part-time contracts frequently for re-entering the labor market.13
10  In addition to these deﬁ  nitions, there are other classiﬁ  cations, which are used for further explanations of labor market ﬂ  ex-
ibility. For more information, see e.g. Beatson (1995), Klau and Mittelstädt (1986) or Blyton (1992).
11  This applies for e.g. women or low-skilled employees. Further information see e.g. Grip et al. (1997) or O'Reilly and Fagan 
(2002).
12  OECD (2010): p. 288.
13  OECD (2010): p. 286.Page ● 12
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3.  Labor market flexibility and innovation
In recent years, research about possible inﬂ  uences on innovation has become more important and many 
studies with data for Italy, Spain or the Netherlands have emerged.14 Thereby, most of all studies focus on 
numerical and functional aspects of labor market ﬂ  exibility. The possible impact of various measurements 
of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility, however, is studied very little.15 This is mostly based on the lack of equivalent data.16 
Theoretically, numerical and functional labor market ﬂ  exibility can have both, negative and positive 
impacts on innovation. In general, a negative correlation between increased labor market ﬂ  exibility and 
innovation is assumed. The main argument for this is based on the assumption that innovation is path 
dependent, i.e. the implementation of new processes or products depends on aspects of the social environ-
ment, company culture, earlier investments as well as accumulated previous knowledge.17 Researchers such 
as Grant (1991) assume therefore that the capabilities of an organization cannot be completely exhausted 
using short-term, temporary and part-time employment contracts. Following Zhou et al. (2011), temporary 
employment contracts undermine the training investments of a company. The knowledge and the produc-
tivity of the employee are migrating to another company. In this way, a company can lose a competitive 
advantage. In addition, employees are only willing to take the risks of innovation, when they get a sense of 
security in their employment.18 
On the other side, arguments for a positive relationship between ﬂ  exible employment contracts and in-
novation can also be found.19 Following the approaches of Kodama (1995) or Matusik and Hill (1998), not 
necessarily only internal resources are used for innovation. Instead, innovations depend much more on the 
effective utilization of technology and knowledge, even beyond internal capacity. So far, external capacities 
can be seen as complementary innovation input factors.20 Especially in the case of open source projects, 
the use of external resources is crucial. In addition, Arvanitis (2005) argues that temporary employment 
contracts facilitate a better alignment on special demand. Flexible employment also allows a larger labor 
turnover, which introduces new knowledge and fresh ideas into a company.21In that way inefﬁ  cient workers 
14  E.g. Pieroni and Pompei (2007), Altuzarra and Serrano (2010) or Zhou et al. (2011). For an overall survey see e.g. Storey 
(2001).
15  This applies especially to the combination of numerical, functional and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility.
16  See e.g. Zhou et al. (2011): p. 3.
17 Pavitt  (1991).
18  Storey et al. (2001): p. 1.
19  Storey et al. (2001): pp. 3–4.
20  Teece (1986): pp. 288–289.
21  Adams and Brock (2004).Page ● 14
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can easier be replaced.22 As Bassanini and Ernst (2002) or Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) emphasized, severe 
restrictions on cancellations may also limit the endeavor of generating labor-saving innovations. Finally, 
Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) think that permanent employees may be disinclined to change in form of in-
novation due to habit or so called lock-in effects.23 In this respect, ﬂ  exible working arrangements such as 
outsourcing, temporary or ﬁ  xed-term contracts can ﬁ  t exactly right for the innovation process.24
The different arguments are also reﬂ  ected in varying results of previous empirical studies. Michie and 
Sheehan (2003) used a large number of indicators for numerical and functional ﬂ  exibility as well as for labor 
turnover. Their results show a clearly negative inﬂ  uence of numerical ﬂ  exibility measured by ﬂ  exible and 
part-time employment contracts. Training and group work as indicators for functional ﬂ  exibility, in contrast, 
have a positive effect on innovation. A summary of individual aspects to so-called human resource man-
agement (HRM) systems make clear that combinations of various ﬂ  exibility measures also act differently.25 
An increased ﬂ  exibility seems to have a positive effect up to a certain limit. Using the logarithm of the new 
products turnover per employee as dependent variable, Zhou et al. (2011) also show a positive impact of 
variables measuring internal functional ﬂ  exibility. At the same time, temporary employment contract also 
seem to affect positively. The results of Pieroni and Pompei (2007) clarify a signiﬁ  cantly negative inﬂ  uence 
of labor turnover on patent. A more qualitative evaluation approach is chosen by Storey et al. (2001). They 
show that the employees directly involved in the innovation process are much less affected by ﬂ  exible work-
ing arrangements.26 Temporary or ﬁ  xed term contracts are used primarily for cost reduction. However, the 
companies that complete many of these ﬂ  exible contracts prove to be highly innovative. Storey et al. (2001) 
suggest that ﬂ  exible employees support the innovators. Therefore, they do not affect innovations directly, 
but rather reﬂ  ect the innovation activities of a company.27 
Most of all studies regarding innovation and labor market ﬂ  exibility focus on numerical and functional 
aspects. Thereby, the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility has hardly been considered. What effects of an increased ﬂ  exibility 
in terms of wages on innovations are possible? Following the neoclassical labor market theory, labor market 
ﬂ  exibility depends strongly on the wages that play a crucial role for the adjustment of labor demand and 
supply towards equilibrium. They result from the marginal productivity of labor and lead to a balanced labor 
market. Following the neoclassic basic idea of optimization and equilibrium, involuntary unemployment is 
22  Zhou et al. (2011): p. 4.
23  Although Zhou et al. (2011) argue that potential lock-in effects could be reduced by training and human resource policies. 
Further details can be found in Zhou et al. (2011): p. 4. 
24  A survey of different theory approaches is given by Pieroni and Pompei (2007): pp. 326–329  or Zhou et al. (2011): pp. 3–6 .
25  Michie and Sheehan (2003): pp. 132–133 .
26  Storey et al. (2001): p. 9.
27  Storey et al. (2001): p. 11.Page ● 15
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only possible by distortions such as excessive wages forced by trade unions.28 For this reason, economists 
have often called to open rigid wages to reduce the unemployment.29 However, Kleinknecht (1998) shows 
that decreasing wages with an associated increase in labor demand and decline in unemployment can also 
be attributed to a low labor productivity growth. This could lead to a low economic growth and in turn to 
reduced labor demand. From an innovation-economic perspective, a company with low labor costs has only 
a limited incentive to replace old by new capital.30 In addition, a restriction of wage increases also leads to a 
prevention of creative destruction, the core of the Schumpeterian theory.31 Due to the possibility of higher 
monopoly proﬁ  ts as a result of a successfully implemented innovation an innovating company has advan-
tages over non-innovators in higher wage demands. Thus an innovator has a higher chance of survival. Fol-
lowing Schumpeter (1976), only strong and innovative companies will survive. By preventing wage increases, 
non-innovators receive additional beneﬁ  ts.32 
However, also rapidly rising wages may reduce innovation incentives. According to current literature, 
a union acts like a tax on intangible capital returns to get a share of quasi￿rents. As Malcomson (1997) 
indicated unions in powerful negotiating positions could skim off potential gains from innovation. For this 
reason, usually a negative inﬂ  uence is assumed.33 However, the negative impact of unionization seems to 
be non-linear. Following the theory of Haucap and Wey (2004), this so called hold-up problem is especially 
important in the case of bargaining at company level.34 A ﬂ  exible wage-bargaining system can therefore 
create incentives for innovation. This leads to the presumption that rigid wages in both directions can have 
negative inﬂ  uences. According to the theoretical considerations we can derive two hypotheses regarding the 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility. 
Hypothesis I
A high degree of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility measured by low wage rigidities has a positive inﬂ  uence on innova-
tion. 
However, the affect of wage levels does not seem to be unambiguous. Both low and high wages may 
have a beneﬁ  cial in terms of innovation. Lower wages allow a company, to invest more ﬁ  nancial resources 
in research and development, whereas higher wages can be viewed as an incentive for innovative effort. The 
direction of the effect depends ultimately on the cost and the target of the planned innovation.
28  A general introduction to the neoclassical labor market theory can be found in Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006).
29  OECD (1994) or Kleinknecht (1998).
30  Kleinknecht (1998): p. 389 and Kleinknecht (1998): p. 391.
31   Schumpeter (1976).
32  See also Kleinknecht (1998): p. 388.
33  A survey of theoretical and empirical evidence of the relationship between unions and innovation can be found in Menezes-
Filho and Van Reenen (2003).
34  For a survey see e.g. Malcomson (1997) or Altuzarra and Serrano (2010).Page ● 16
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Hypothesis II
The impact of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility measured by wage levels differs depending on the type of innovation. 
The data as well as the empirical model to test these hypotheses are described in the following chapters.Page ● 17
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4. Data
The available dataset is a combination of various data of the Netherlands. On the one hand, we used 
two datasets from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), the central bureau of statistics of the Neth-
erlands in The Hague. First, we use the innovation information provided by the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS). The CIS dataset of the European Commission is an innovation survey with a standardized 
questionnaire for all participating European countries. In this way, it offers harmonized information on 
research and innovation such as personal and expenditure for R & D or incentives as well as barriers to in-
novate. 
In addition, data of the Dutch income tax ofﬁ  ce are used. This employee’s level dataset contains ex-
tensive information about employment contracts such as working hours, wages or special payments. Fur-
thermore, data on the employees themselves such as gender or age are included. An ID number allows the 
assignment of employees to a company. The entry and exit data indicate the duration of employment of an 
individual employed in a speciﬁ  c company within a respective year. In addition, they illustrate the employ-
ment changes within an organization.35 The variable CAO, assigned by the negotiating union, shows for each 
employee whether its salary was negotiated collectively. The number identiﬁ  es a speciﬁ  c collective agree-
ment, if one was completed. However, there is no information if this potential agreement was negotiated 
at company or at industry level.
To include this information in the analysis, we used the Dutch Collective Labour Agreements Data-
base and Monitor (DUCADAM) of the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), an 
independent research institute of the University of Amsterdam. This data collection contains all collective 
labor agreements (CLAs) in the Netherlands, resulting from an extensive inquiry as well as a co-operation 
with the Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV), the Dutch Trade Union Confederation. In addition 
to the CAO number, the dataset also includes relevant company and negotiating variables, such as the level 
of the bargaining process.36 The CAO number is used for matching the DUCADAM data with the wage 
dataset from the CBS. The overlap between both datasets is about 97 %. Aggregated on company level, we 
matched this dataset with the CIS data using the company’s ID. In this way, information about research and 
innovation could be associated with labor market data. Due to the fact that the CIS record does not contain 
35  Thereby, the entrance month is counted only if the employment has started not later than the 15th day of the month. On the 
other side, the leaving month is counted only if the employment has determined after the 15th day of the month.
36  Further information about the DUCADAM dataset can be found in Hartog et al. (1999). Details about the variables and their 
coding are given in Schreuder and Tijdens (2004).Page ● 18
Eva Wachsen and Knut Blind
information about the public sector, we excluded all observations of the public sector of the wage dataset. 
The coupled dataset contains data for every second year from 1998 until 2008. With approximately 9,000 
surveyed companies per year, the whole dataset covers about 50,000 observations. Table 1 summarizes some 
descriptive statistics for a survey of the entire record.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the dataset 
All companies Innovating companies
Innovation 36.59 %
Process innovation 21.58 %
Product innovation 27.79 %
Manufacturing sectors 28.74 % 42.51 %
Service sectors 57.82 % 48.01 %
Service related sectors 13.44 % 94.90 %
Small sized companies (less than 50) 50.75 % 39.61 %
Medium sized companies (50-199) 39.07 % 44.06 %
Large sized companies (200 and more)  10.18 % 16.33 %
Researching companies 12.37 % 31.30 %
Share of part-time employees 36.42 % 30.06 %
Share of full-time employees 63.58 % 69.94 %
Share of employees with ﬂ  exible contract 6.58 % 3.20 %
Share of employees with ﬁ  xed contract 93.42 % 96.80 %
Share of employees with temporary contract 24.45 % 21.04 %
Share of employees with permanent contract 75.55 % 78.96 %
Collective wage bargaining at industry level 86.11 % 82.71 %
Collective wage bargaining at company level 6.12 % 9.58 %
No collective wage bargaining 7.77 % 7.70 %
Medium wage per employee 115.6391 85.662
Source: CBS, AIAS 1998-2008, own calculations
More than 36 % of the companies in the dataset are innovators. With nearly 28 %, product innova-
tions are more frequent than process innovations. The data shows that more than 65 % of all companies 
belong to services or service-related sectors and only about 30 % to manufacturing industries. However, 
most of the innovating companies are manufacturing ﬁ  rms. The most frequently services are the rental as 
well as the wholesale sector. In the industry sectors, construction is the most frequently business ﬁ  eld. Most 
of the companies are small with less than 50 employees. Only about 10 % are big companies with 200 or 
more employees. The company’s size seems to be a crucial variable for innovation. About 60 % of all large 
companies have generated at least one successful innovation. Only about 12 % of all companies are doing 
research regularly. However, 95 % of them are successful innovators.
Most of the companies have a wage agreement at industry level. The share of agreements at company 
level is about 7 % and increasing over time. With more than 90 % the most of all ﬁ  rms pay a collectively 
bargained wage. Thereby, bargaining at industry level is especially important for small companies. Large 
companies with more than 200 employees, however, usually choose a negotiation at company level. This 
can be seen in Figure 1. Page ● 19
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  Figure 1: Share of big, medium and small sized companies in percent depending on the level of wage bar-
gaining. Big companies have 200 or more employees, medium sized 50 or more and less than 200. Small 
















Deviations from 100 percent due to missing values
Source: CBS, AIAS 1998 - 2008, own calculations
At the same time, company level bargaining is of much higher importance for innovating companies. 
Following Figure 2, this is particularly true for new products, while bargaining at industry level is at least 
represented in process innovations.


















Deviations from 100 percent due to missing values 
Source: CBS, AIAS 1998 - 2008, own calculationsPage ● 20
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The average wage per employed at companies with an innovation is signiﬁ  cantly lower. About 60 % of 
employees of all companies are working on full-time, only less than 40 % on part-time. Most of all employ-
ees are working on a ﬁ  xed contract. With an average of about 75 %, most employees have an indeﬁ  nite con-
tract. At least, more than 60 % of all companies give all of their employees a permanent working contract. 
The proportion is even higher in innovating companies.Page ● 21
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5. Empirical  Model
As the dependent variable, we ﬁ  rst use the binary-coded variable INNNO for an innovation of a com-
pany. It can be interpreted as the probability of an innovation within the last three years. In a further step, 
we distinguish between product and process innovations using the variables PROCESS and PRODUCT. 
The CIS dataset uses the ofﬁ  cial deﬁ  nitions of the Oslo Manual of the European Commission. Therefore, 
an innovation is the implementation of a new or signiﬁ  cantly improved product or process.37 Due to the 
binary coding of the dependent variables, we use a panel probit model.38 
According to the theoretical basis, we divide the explanatory variables into different ﬂ  exibility classes. At 
ﬁ  rst, we examine the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility. It is illustrated with the help of several variables and can be divided 
into two different groups. The ﬁ  rst variables explain information about the bargaining process representing 
potential rigidity of wages. The grouped variable BARGAINLEV speciﬁ  es the level of wage bargaining. 
The higher the value the more likely the transaction takes place at a decentralized level. The lowest value is 
the inﬂ  exible wage setting at the industry level. In contrast, a fully ﬂ  exible wage setting system includes no 
common bargaining. According to our hypothesis I we expect a positive impact of the variable BRAGAIN-
COV on innovation. Following the model of Haucap and Wey (2004), the inﬂ  uence of the level of wage 
negotiations on the incentive to innovate is not linear.39 To take into account for possible non-linearity, we 
use individual wage-setting levels in the regression in a further step. Using the most centralized collective 
agreements at industry level INDLEV as reference category, NOLEV identiﬁ  es companies without any col-
lective bargaining agreements, whereas COMPLEV stands for companies with a wage-setting at ﬁ  rm level. 
The variable BARGAINCOV indicates the percentage of employees in a company for whom the collective-
ly agreed wage applies. This variable can have both positive and negative impacts. The greater the number 
of employees with collectively negotiated wage, the higher the lack of a company’s ﬂ  exibility. On the other 
hand, this leads to a decrease of transaction costs and the negotiation efforts. The second group of variables 
explaining ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility describes the exact amount of wages. MEDWAGE is the monthly average 
wage per employee. As we already discussed before the effect can be both, positive and negative. Following 
37  OECD (2005): p. 31.
38  Due to various observations without a change in the binary coded variables such as industry, group, research or collective 
agreements, we choose a random panel model. The topic lends itself to an analysis with time-series models. Nevertheless, we 
decided to use cross-section data over a certain time period. This allows us to append a panel model, which produces two main 
advantages. The CIS dataset contains panel data. This offers the advantage of excluding unobserved heterogeneity. In addi-
tion, we tried to maximize the comparability to previous studies, which also use panel models or at least pooled cross-section 
data. See e.g. Pieroni and Pompei (2007): p. 336, Giannetti and Madic (2007): p. 8 or Zhou et al. (2011): p. 7. 
39  In their model Haucap and Wey show that coordinated bargaining at company level has the lowest incentives for cost reducing 
process innovations. However, centralized wage-setting has a positive inﬂ  uence. See Haucap and Wey (2004).Page ● 22
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our hypothesis II, the coefﬁ  cient will depend on the type of innovation. The wage also depends on age, 
experience, education and position. Wage differentials can therefore also act as a monetary incentive for an 
increasing work productivity and creativity. That is why we include the wage differentials within a company 
DIFFWAGE in the equation. We expect a positive relationship between DIFFWAGE and innovation. 
Furthermore, we investigate the numerical and functional ﬂ  exibility. Due to the fact that no information 
about training or further education can be found in the dataset, we put together internal and external com-
ponents. PARTTIME is the proportion of part-time employees, while EMPLOYSTAT indicates the share 
of workers with a ﬂ  exible employment status. In addition to temporary employees, these kinds of employ-
ment also include on-demand workers. The proportion of workers with a temporary employment contract 
is represented by the variable TEMPEMP. According to the results from the descriptive statistics, we expect 
a negative inﬂ  uence of the inserted measures of numerical and functional ﬂ  exibility.
An additional measurement of changes in employment and thus of the ﬂ  exibility of labor within a 
company is the labor turnover. An overall high labor turnover seems to indicate for a ﬂ  exible adjustment of 
the number of employees.40 The labor turnover is measured by two variables. LABIN gives the share of the 
employees who start working within a year in the company. LABOUT on the other hand measures the per-
centage of associates who leave the company within a year. The way of how the labor turnover might affect 
the incentives for innovation depends on the costs of employment as well as on use of human capital. On 
the one hand, looking for new staff generates additional costs. The exact amount of the costs is determined 
by factors such as the industry or the requirements of the vacancy. On the other hand, the longer an em-
ployee is employed in a company, the stronger its negotiating position and its possible capture of innovation 
rents.41 In addition to the cost side, the human capital of the employees plays a crucial role for innovations. 
A company loses the human capital of its outgoing staff. However, new employees can bring in new ideas. 
Therefore, we expect a negative inﬂ  uence of LABOUT, while LABIN affect rather positive.
The control variables include at ﬁ  rst the company’s size SIZE, measured by the logarithmic number 
of employees. On the one hand, the size of a company illustrates possible economies of scale and better 
opportunities in the ﬁ  nancial market.42 On the other side, SIZE illustrates a higher accumulated human 
capital. For these reasons and according to current innovation research, a positive inﬂ  uence is expected.43 
The same applies to the logarithm of annual sales per employee TURN. Here we use the turnover of the 
40  Further information about labor turnover can be found in Arnott and Stiglitz (1985).
41  Bassanini and Ernst (2002): p. 11.
42  Michie and Sheehan (2003): p. 130.
43  A survey can be found e.g. in Àcs and Audretsch (1987).Page ● 23
More ﬂ  exibility for more innovation?
previous period, as it serves as ﬁ  nancial resources available to invest in the implemented innovation. This 
further reduces potential simultaneity problems with the used innovation variables.44 An innovation is based 
mostly on foregoing research. For this reason, we also control for existing research activities of a company 
using the binary coded variable RESEARCH, for which we expect a high positive value. The binary coded 
variable HEAD labels companies with headquarters in the Netherlands and is used here as a measure of 
activities in foreign markets. The variable GROUP is also binary-coded and refers to companies that are 
part of a corporate group. Belonging to a large group of companies, a company can beneﬁ  t from research 
and knowledge of other group members. In addition, economies of scale can also be assumed in business 
groups. For these reasons, we expect a positive inﬂ  uence on this variable.45
The ﬁ  rm’s age is an important factor and makes it therefore one of the most used control variables. 
Unfortunately, the dataset does not contain information about the age of a company. For this reason, we use 
the age of employees as a proxy.46 The age of employees may also take on other control functions. Young 
employees, who are highly skilled and motivated, are mostly working in young companies. Thus, young 
employees might have an additional positive inﬂ  uence on the productivity of young companies.47 One the 
other side, older employees have more experience on average. So far, a company also beneﬁ  ts of a mixture 
of young and old employees. To address these considerations, we include the share of employees older than 
50 OLD and the variation of age within a company DIFFAGE into the equation. For the control of differ-
ent factors for innovation activities of the manufacturing, we include the grouped variable SERVICE in the 
analysis to distinguish service and other sectors from manufacturing industries. In addition, the individual 
dummies SECTORS and YEARS for all industries and years are included.48 
Table 2 summarizes both individual empirical regression models and describes the variables used in each 
case.
44  For example, similar dissolved by Michie and Sheehan (2003): pp. 129–130.
45  Using this variable, we also want to consider that the data of the CBS is collected at the level of operating units and not at the 
level of entire companies. For this reason, only a few large and very large observations are preserved in the record.
46  Following the results of Ouimet and Zarutskie (2011), the employee’s age is strongly positively associated with the age of the 
company. See Ouimet and Zarutskie (2011): p. 1. 
47  See Ouimet and Zarutskie (2011): p. 1.
48  Therefore, we also try to control for the different market structures of each industry. Information about the possible inﬂ  u-
ences of market structure on innovation can be found in Àcs and Audretsch (1987) or Cohen and Levin (1989). Additional 
descriptive statistics with the averages of all included variables can be found in Table 5 in the appendix.Page ● 24
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Table 2: Description of included variables and regression models
Variables Description Code I II
Dependent variables
INNOVATION Business unit (BE) had a successful innovation Binary x x
PROCESS BE had a successful process innovation Binary x x
PRODUCT BE had a successful product innovation Binary x x
Financial ﬂ  exibility
BARGAINLEV Degree of centralization of wage bargaining  Grouped 1-3 x x
BARGAINCOV Share of employees with a collectively bargained wage Percentage x x
NOLEV No collectively bargained wages     Binary x
COMPLEV Collective bargaining at company level Binary x
INDLEV  Collective bargaining at industry level Binary
DIFFWAGE Wage differential within a BE Continuous x x
MEDWAGE Average monthly wage per employee within a BE Continuous x x
Numerical, functional ﬂ  exibility
PARTTIME Share of part-time employees in BE Percentage x x
EMPLOYSTAT Share of employees with ﬂ  exible contract in BE  Percentage x x
TEMPEMP Share of employees with a temporary contract in BE Percentage x x
Labor turnover
LABIN Share of employees who entered the BE within a year  Percentage x x
LABOUT Share of employees who left the BE within a year Percentage x x
Control variables
SIZE Logarithm of the number of employees within a BE Continuous x x
TURN Logarithm of the previous annual BE turnover  Continuous x x
RESEARCH BE is doing research Binary x x
HEAD Headquarter of the BE is in the Netherlands Binary x x
GROUP BE is part of a group of companies Binary x x
OLD Share of employees older than 50 within a BE Percentage x x
DIFFAGE Age differential within a BE Continuous x x
SERVICE BE belongs to the service sectors Binary x x
SECTOR Sectors  dummies Binary x x
YEARS Year  dummies Binary x xPage ● 25
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6. Results
The results of the random panel probit regression for model I of Table 2. are presented in Table 3. 
The coefﬁ  cients are sorted by both, the different types of ﬂ  exibility as well as the types of innovation. The 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility, measured by a number of wage data, seems to have an overall positive impact on the im-
plementation of an innovation. This applies to both process and product innovations. However, on closer 
inspection of each variable, some signiﬁ  cant differences between the two types of innovation can be found. 
Additionally, the effects of the two groups of variables to measure ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility vary. Thus, the effects 
of variables for bargaining and commitment of wages are signiﬁ  cantly higher for new processes, while the 
information about the actual wage levels seems to have a stronger inﬂ  uence on products.Page ● 26
Eva Wachsen and Knut Blind



















































































































SECTORS Yes Yes Yes
YEARS Yes Yes Yes
Statistics N 16444
Pseudo-R2 .81037 .81350 .83797
Log-LL -7762.3707 -7634.2526 -6632.5795
Source: CBS, AIAS 1996 – 2008, own calculations. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁ  cance levels: ***/**/* 1 %/5 %/10 %
Considering new processes, the inﬂ  uence of the level of wage bargaining BARGAINLEV is the highest. 
The more a wage is set on a ﬂ  exible level the higher the probability of a process innovation. Our hypothesis 
I can therefore be conﬁ  rmed at least for process innovation innovations. However, the effect on products is 
only about half as big and not signiﬁ  cant. The same applies to the bargaining coverage BARGCAOV within 
a company. A high proportion of employees within a company, who are affected by the wage agreements, 
has a signiﬁ  cantly positive inﬂ  uence on new processes. In contrast, the effect on products is even slightly Page ● 27
More ﬂ  exibility for more innovation?
negative and again not signiﬁ  cant. The higher the average wage of a company, the lower the probability 
of an innovation. According to the results of the variable MEDWAGE, this statement applies to all types 
of innovation, whereas the impact on products is slightly higher. Only a slight but signiﬁ  cant and positive 
inﬂ  uence on all types of innovation can be found in the variable DIFFWAGE. As suggested in advance, a 
high difference of all wages within a company can be understood as an incentive for innovation. However, 
the coefﬁ  cient for new products is again slightly higher. Due to these differences between the two types of 
innovation, our second hypothesis can also be conﬁ  rmed.
The variables of the numerical and functional labor market ﬂ  exibility have a throughout negative inﬂ  u-
ence, both on products and processes. Thereby, PARTTIME has a higher and more signiﬁ  cant impact on 
processes. That means, the higher the share of employees working on part-time, the lower the probability 
of a successful process innovation. Variables for the length and the security of the employment contract, 
however, seem to have a much smaller inﬂ  uence on processes. Both, EMPLOYSTAT and TEMPEMP, have 
only a small and not signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence. In contrast, the coefﬁ  cients and the signiﬁ  cance level of both 
variables are signiﬁ  cantly higher in products. A low job security seems to be negatively correlated with the 
successful implementation of new products. This suggests a possible higher signiﬁ  cance of the employee’s 
working motivation towards the development of product innovations, while process innovations seem to 
depend rather on working hours. 
The coefﬁ  cients of the variables measuring the labor turnover show the expected directions. LABIN as 
the proportion of employees, who start working in a given year, has a high positive and signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence 
on innovation. However, the coefﬁ  cient is slightly smaller for processes. That means, that new products de-
pend more on new entrants with new human capital and also new ideas. On the other hand, the probability 
of an innovation decreases signiﬁ  cantly with LABOUT, the share of employees, who leave the company 
within a year. Again, the coefﬁ  cients of the two types of innovation vary. The leave of employees has a 
greater negative impact on process innovations. Overall, the labor turnover affects all types of innovation 
positively. Due to the varying coefﬁ  cients, the total effect of labor turnover is lower for processes. 
The control variables show the expected positive effects of the variable ﬁ  rm size SIZE and the annual 
turnover per employee of the previous period TURN. According to a higher coefﬁ  cient for product inno-
vations, the development of new products seems to require higher investments. As presumed, the variable 
SERVICE is negative. That means that service sectors have a generally lower rate of innovation. Companies 
engaged in intensive research have a signiﬁ  cantly higher probability of a successful innovation. Thereby, the Page ● 28
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inﬂ  uence of RESEARCH on product innovations is again much higher. This means that the development 
of new products depends much more on research as new processes. The control variable HEAD is slightly 
negative in general for innovation, however, slightly positive for processes and products. In each case the 
coefﬁ  cients are not signiﬁ  cant. A company that is part of a group of companies has a positive impact on 
innovation. However, the degree of impact on new products of the variable GROUP is about twice as high 
as on the development of new processes. The share of employees older than 50 OLD, used as a proxy for 
company age, has a strong negative impact on the probability of an innovation, both on products as well as 
on processes. This corresponds to the results of most of the innovation research.49 Also the variation of 
employee’s age DIFFAGE has an overall negative, but only slight inﬂ  uence. The used control dummies for 
the included industries show a high probability for a process innovation in the energy sector, gas and water, 
while product innovations occur more frequently in the chemistry or the mechanical engineering industry. 
In contrast, both new processes and new products appear at least in the catering and the retail sector.50 
A far-reaching analysis of wage ﬂ  exibility is made     in the further step. Now, the individual negotiation 
levels are inserted into the equation. NOLEV stands for no collectively negotiated wages, while COMPLEV 
identiﬁ  es ﬁ  rms with wage negotiations at company level. The results can be found in Table 4. In comparison 
to centralized wage bargaining at the industry level, a positive inﬂ  uence on innovation of both no collective 
bargaining and wage setting at company level can be found. This applies to processes as well as for prod-
ucts. Thereby, NOLEV has the greatest positive impact. In addition, as stated above for the components of 
wage ﬂ  exibility, the bargaining levels have a signiﬁ  cantly higher inﬂ  uence on the development of processes 
than of products. However, the assumed non-linearity as stated by Haucap and Wey (2004) cannot be found 
in our estimations, which is consistent with our hypothesis I. Regarding process innovations, no collective 
bargaining has a much more positive inﬂ  uence compared to wage setting at industry level than collective 
agreements at company level. The same holds for product innovations, although the difference between 
both coefﬁ  cients is only very small and the results for both are not signiﬁ  cant.  
Including the individual levels of negotiation changes the inﬂ  uence of the other variables of ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  exibility. However, the changes only affect the variables related to the wage bargaining process. The co-
efﬁ  cient of BARGAINCOV decreases in all types of innovation. The impact on products is even more 
negative. In addition, the signiﬁ  cance level decreases slightly. MEDWAGE remains the same, but with a 
49  See e.g. Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004).
50  Regarding the variables used to measure the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility and their impact on innovation, also a reverse causality could 
be conceivable. For this reason, we calculated separate regression equations for each variable with innovation as an independ-
ent variable. In addition, we used the instrumental variable approach with lagged versions of each variable as instruments. The 
results did not change. Therefore, we assume that there are no biases.Page ● 29
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slight decrease of signiﬁ  cance. The inﬂ  uence of DIFFWAGE also remains unchanged positive and signiﬁ  -
cant. The inﬂ  uence of the negotiation variables on new processes is still strongest. On the other hand, the 
variables relating to the actual wage level have fundamentally more impact on new products, so that our 
hypothesis II is further conﬁ  rmed. This suggests that not the actual wage level but the binding nature of 
wage bargaining as well as the level of coverage within a company have a particularly strong impact on a 
company’s new processes.
Table 4: Results of the random panel probit panel regression, model II 






















































































































SECTORS Yes Yes Yes
YEARS Yes Yes Yes
Statistics N 16444
Pseudo-R2 .810378 .813503 .837974
Log-LL -7762.0902 -7634.1916 -6632.4634
Source: CBS, AIAS 1996 – 2008, own calculations. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁ  cance levels: ***/**/* 1 %/5 %/10 %Page ● 30
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The inﬂ  uence of the variables to measure numerical and functional ﬂ  exibility remains the same. It is still 
true that the inﬂ  uence of PARTTIME is signiﬁ  cantly higher for new processes, while both EMPLOYSTAT 
and TEMPEMP have a signiﬁ  cantly higher inﬂ  uence on new products. That means part-time workers have 
a negative impact on innovations, especially on new and cost-saving production methods. The impact of 
easy cancelable working contracts, however, is only very slightly negative and not signiﬁ  cant on new pro-
cesses. In contrast, these contracts have a very negative effect on new products based on extensive research 
and reliable staff. Regarding the variables of labor turnover, again, everything remains the same. Following 
the coefﬁ  cient of LABIN, new workers are particularly important for new products. Disposals measured 
by LABOUT have a more negative inﬂ  uence on new processes. Overall, however, the ﬂ  uctuation is not as 
critical for new processes as for new products.
Also the control variables do not change. The SIZE impacts positive, while the age variables OLD and 
SDAGE, used as proxies for the ﬁ  rm’s age, affect rather negative. The variable TURN is still more impor-
tant for products that seem require greater investments. The same applies to the variable group. Corpora-
tions usually have greater economies of scale, more money available and better conditions in the ﬁ  nancial 
market. In addition, they beneﬁ  t from more cumulative human capital and opportunities for cooperation 
and knowledge spillovers. Research also seems to be much more important for products than for processes.
At last, the results of the regressions show that innovations are most likely in large, regular industrial 
ﬁ  rms that conduct research on a regular basis and whose employees are mostly younger than 50 years old. 
Regarding the ﬂ  exibility variables, new processes are likely at companies with a low employment change 
and more full-time workers, who choose for the largest share of their employees a more decentralized wage 
setting. Companies with product innovations on the other hand are characterized by a high proportion of 
employees with a ﬁ  xed and permanent contract with a lower wage level as well as by a high number of new 
entries.Page ● 31
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7. Conclusions
At least, we could ﬁ  nd out that ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility as a part of labor market ﬂ  exibility indeed has an 
impact on the probability to innovate. However, the effects differ depending on the type of innovation. First 
of all, the variables used to measure ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility can be divided into two groups. One group contains 
information about the actual wage levels in a company. The effects of these variables are almost the same 
for both processes and products, whereas the coefﬁ  cients for products are a little bit higher. Thereby, a 
higher wage differential within a company has a positive impact, while a higher average wage affects rather 
negative. The other group of variables of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility considers the wage bargaining process as well 
as the number of employees with a collectively negotiated wage within a company. These variables differ 
with respect to height and direction of their inﬂ  uences as well as in relation to the signiﬁ  cance level. Re-
garding process innovations, the impact of a more ﬂ  exible wage bargaining is positive and signiﬁ  cant. This 
is also true for the individual wage setting levels NOLEV and COMPLEV. Moreover, a high bargaining 
coverage within a company also encourages process innovation. In contrast, the bargaining level has only a 
slightly positive and not signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on the development of new products. The bargaining coverage 
even affects negatively, but the coefﬁ  cient is again not signiﬁ  cant. Finally, there is a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility, but the overall effect depends strongly on the type of innovation. The impact on process 
innovation seems to be considerably larger. Additionally, the individual variables used to measure ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  exibility affect very differently. Insofar, the strength of the effect depends on both the type of innovation 
as well as the precise measurement of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility. 
Basically, the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility refers particularly to the cost side of a company. Process innovations, 
which are mostly targeted on a cost reduction and an associated increase in productivity, therefore deal pre-
cisely with this cost side. Thus, the more ﬂ  exible the ﬁ  nancial statements of a company, the easier it seems 
to implement a successful cost-reducing process innovation. Thereby, the actual wage level appears to have 
no particularly strong inﬂ  uence. It’s more about the opportunity to change these ongoing labor costs. The 
same applies looking at the numerical and functional aspects of labor market ﬂ  exibility. Part-time has a 
signiﬁ  cantly negative inﬂ  uence on the probability of a process innovation. This coefﬁ  cient is even higher 
and more signiﬁ  cant than for products. But the variables about the working contract are not that much 
important for processes than for products. A ﬂ  exible and non-permanent contract reduces only slightly 
and not signiﬁ  cantly the incentives to develop a process innovation. That means, a more ﬂ  exible contract Page ● 32
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termination as well as a more ﬂ  exible wage setting is an important point for cost-reducing and productivity 
enhancing processes. On the other side, the development of new products seems to depend much more on 
the contract form and its impacts on the motivation of all employees. A product innovation usually needs 
more ﬁ  nancial resources and involves therefore a higher risk for the company as well as for its employees. 
This is also reﬂ  ected in the coefﬁ  cients of the control variables TURN ad RESEARCH in our regression 
results Table 3 and Table 4. A product innovation requires more research as well as more prior investments 
than a process innovation. To make its employees able to take this risk, a company has to give them an incen-
tive. Thereby, a full-time contract does not seem to have a big impact. The coefﬁ  cient in our results is not 
signiﬁ  cant. But the incentive seems to be much more about labor security. The negative impact of a ﬂ  exible 
employment status on a product innovation is more than four times higher than for a process innovation. 
The same holds for non-permanent contracts. They reduce the probability of a new product more than 
three times more than they reduce the incentive for new processes. An additional incentive could be the 
wage differential. As stated above, the wage bargaining process do not have a huge impact on the develop-
ment of product innovations. But the variables of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility regarding the actual wage levels affect 
much more. The higher the wage differential of all employees within a company, the higher seems to be 
the probability of a new product. Hence, the wage differential could also be an incentive for an employee 
to make its contribution to the development of a new product.51  But what implications can be conclusively 
drawn from an innovation economic perspective? Promoting a more ﬂ  exible wage setting at company level 
or at least no collective bargaining in combination with more ﬂ  exible working contracts could support an 
easier development of process innovations. In addition, the level of wage negotiation should involve most 
of all employees within a company. A stabilization of the individual wage bargaining levels that are already 
weakened by possible opening clauses should therefore be encouraged.52 
On the other side, supporting working contracts that could increase the labor security and therefore also 
the incentives to take the higher risk of a product innovation can enhance the probabilities to develop new 
products. At least, it seems like the need of more ﬂ  exibility to be more innovative depends strongly on the 
type of innovation. While processes seem to require a more ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility regarding the wage-setting 
processes, the development of new products, in contrast, seems to need higher incentives and ask therefore 
51  We are trying to make a clear distinction between process and product innovation. We know that, in some cases, a process 
innovation follows a product innovation, especially in the case of a drastic creation of an entirely new product with an as-
sociated new market. A successful creation of a new product can sometimes force the development of a corresponding new 
production method. However, drastic product innovations are rare and just an exception. In addition, most of the process 
innovations in our data are clearly related to the cost side of a company. For this reason, we assume a more cost-driven way 
of thinking in the development of new processes. 
52  See also Haucap and Wey (2004).Page ● 33
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for a higher labor security. Thus, it seems like process innovations require for more and product innovations 
for less ﬂ  exibility and more stability.  
The creation of an innovation-friendly environment promotes both the domestic and especially the in-
ternational competitiveness. However, reverse effects of innovation in turn on employment should also be 
considered. Although a cost-efﬁ  cient production and a resulting increase in productivity should be encour-
aged, process innovations mostly have a negative impact on the labor demand of a company. In the long 
run, process innovations are usually classiﬁ  ed as labor saving. Effective production methods allow more 
and more the replacement of labor by capital.53 For this reason, the conditions for both types of innovation 
should be considered.
53  More information can be found in Edquist et al. (2001).Page ● 34
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Appendix
Table 5: Averages of all variables included in the regression models 
Variables
Innovation Process innovation Product innovation
Y e sN oY e sN oY e sN o
Financial ﬂ  exibility
BARGAINLEV .2499 .1996 .2535 .2023 .2604 .2015
NOLEV .0770 .0791 .0713 .0785 .0795 .0779
COMPLEV .0958 .0414 .1108 .0454 .1014 .0457
INDLEV .8271 .8795   .8178 .8761 .8191 .8764
BARGAINCOV .6125 .6744 .6522 .6601 .5999 .6738
MEDWAGE 85.662 131.340 73.050 125.007 86.7309 124.990
DIFFWAGE 1334.022 1106.393 1348.396 1136.733 1369.232 1118.227
Numerical, functional ﬂ  exibility
PARTTIME .3006 .3908 .2938 .3752 .2903 .3830
EMPLOYSTSAT .0320 .0632 .0324 .0575 .0283 .0606
TEMPEMP .2104 .2447 .2060 .2385 .2075 .2413
Labor turnover
LABIN .1783577   .2095017   .1754669   .204915   .1760757   .2065577  
LABOUT .1944554   .2372936   .190432   .230545   .1894199   .2339379  
Control variables
SIZE 4.212538 3.549829 4.35449 3.623401 4.2419 3.616357
TURN 5.030475 4.799961 5.072833 4.832042 5.036728 4.824658
SERVICE 1.66979 1.948782 1.602193   1.9044   1.629225   1.927407  
RESEARCH .3129728   .0092058   .3510856   .0563193   .378779   .0207072  
GROUP .6584875   .5148215   .6671053   .5354923    .6746049   .5251275  
HOLLAND .9418824   .9731351   .931652   .9675706   .9384877   .9698819   
OLD .1891 .1964 .1895 .1952 .1884 .1957
DIFFAGE 10.603 11.105 10.627 11.022 10.523 11.077
Source: CBS, AIAS 1998-2008, own calculationsPage ● 36
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